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1 January 11, 2011; 1:37 p.m. 1 issue of fact, but not one of a material fact given the 
2 PROCEEDINGS 2 fact of the affirmative defenses put forth under 
3 --000-- 3 Faragher and Ellerth by the defense. 
4 THE COURT: We are on the record then for 4 The defense then has asked the Court to 
5 First District Court for Kootenai County. I'm District 5 reconsider its order denying the summary judgment sought 
6 Judge Lansing Haynes. This is the matter of Victoria 6 by the defense on the issue that the plaintiff 
7 Johnson versus North Idaho College. It ls civil case 7 unreasonably delayed in reporting the sexual harassment 
8 06-7150. Plaintiff in the matter Is represented by 8 and did so as a matter of law. That it is not a fact 
9 Mr. James McMIiian. The defendant is represented by 9 for the jury to determine, but as a matter of law her 
10 Mr. Bruce Castleton. Both of those parties are 10 delay in reporting was an unreasonable one. 
11 appearing telephonlcally. 11 The Court had found there to be genuine issues 
12 This is the time set for the Court to announce 12 of material fact on that particular issue; the 
13 its decision regarding defendant's motion to reconsider 13 reasonableness of her delay in reporting. The defense 
14 the Court's previous order that was denying summary 14 in the matter argued that the Faragher affirmative 
15 judgment that was sought by the defense. The Court has 15 defenses shield North Idaho College from liability for 
16 read all of the submissions both in opposition to and In 16 damages that would not have occurred had the victim 
17 support of the motion to reconsider and did hear and 17 promptly reported. 
18 consider the oral arguments that were previously 18 The plaintiff In this matter did not report 
19 presented; therefore, the Court has chosen not to file a 19 the sexual harassment in the best light or in the light 
20 memorandum or write a memorandum decision. 20 most favorable to the plaintiff until approximately five 
21 The findings of fact and conclusions of law 21 months had passed from the last contact. That being the 
22 articulated by the Court today are the same findings of 22 end of the summer vacation of two thousand and -- I've 
23 fact that have been articulated previously. The facts 23 lost the year, whether it was 2005 or 2006. But at any 
24 have not changed any and the Court did articulate those 24 rate, the last contact was at the end of the summer 
5 in its previous decision. The Court's articulation of 25 vacation. She then reported it the following January 
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1 conclusions of law today are the conclusions that the l when she learned that her grade In that computer class 
2 Court will be relying on for its decision. 2 that she believed was going to be listed as an 
3 In this matter, the Court was asked by the 3 incomplete had, in fact, by college policy been changed 
4 defense to reconsider the denial of summary judgment 4 to an F. She believed that was some form of retaliation 
5 and, first of all, ask the Court to more or less retreat 5 on the part of Mr. Friis and therefore reported the 
6 from its finding that there were genuine Issues of 6 sexual harassment. 
7 material fact regarding the issue -- or the course and 7 And the Court was -- is cognizant of the 
8 the scope of the employment of Mr. Friis, F-R-I-1-S, In 8 holding -- or at least it was instructed in the Mukaida, 
9 terms of whether he was acting within the scope and 9 M-U-K-A-I-D-A, versus Hawaii case at 159 F.2nd 1211, a 
10 course of his employment through North Idaho College. 10 2001 case from the Federal District Court of the State 
11 The Court was urged to retract that from its 11 of Hawaii. The synopsis holding of that particular case 
12 decision-making process in that that issue of scope and 12 is that for a plaintiff to wait until the harassment has 
13 course of employment, it was alleged was subsumed within 13 ended to report that alleged harassment denies the 
14 the Faragher and Ellerth affinmative defenses. And for 14 ability to the employer to correct and is therefore 
15 our court reporter I want to say Faragher is 15 unreasonable as a matter of law, And the Court did 
16 F-A-R-A-G-H-E-R versus the City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 6 consider that particular reasoning in that case. It may 
17 775. It's a 1998 case. And then the other one is 17 be not for stare decisis as the precedent before the 
18 Burlington Industries, Inc., versus Ellerth, 18 Court, possibly persuasive reasoning nevertheless, 
19 E-L-L-E-R-T-H, at 524 U.S. 742, a 1998 case, 19 The defense also asked the Court to find that 
20 The Court did find that there were genuine 20 the bare fear of retaliation on the part of the 
21 issues of fact regarding the scope and course of 21 plaintiff is unreasonable as a matter of law and as an 
22 employment, but the Court does agree now with the 22 explanation for her nonreportlng during the course of 
23 defendant that that issue is subsumed in the Faragher 23 the sexual harassment. The court -- this court has 
24 defenses and that it is no longer considered to be a 24 previously found that it was posslble for this jury or a 
25 genuine issue of material fact It may be a genuine 25 jury who heard this case to conclude that the plaintiff 
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1 did not report because she needed Mr. Friis's 1 
2 cooperation with the "I" grade in order to stay enrolled 2 
3 in the college and to keep her financial aid available 3 
4 and that she feared a retaliation. 4 
5 The Court made reference to the fact that her 5 
6 educational goals seemed to lead through Mr. Friis's 6 
7 computer class and she more or less needed to keep him 7 
8 happy in order for her to reach those goals and maybe 8 
9 she feared retaliation and that a jury could find. 9 
1 O The defense has asked the Court to find as a 1 O 
11 matter of law that fear of retaliation or a subjective 11 
12 fear of retaliation is unreasonable as a matter of law. 12 
13 The Court read carefully the case of Baldwin versus Blue 13 
14 Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama at 480 F.3rd 1287. That's 14 
15 a 2007 case out of the 11th Circuit. In that case there 15 
16 was delayed report on behalf of an employee who did not 1 6 
1 7 report her supervisor's sexually harassing behavior. 1 7 
18 She did not prepare a report out of a fear of 18 
19 retaliation from that particular supervisor. 19 
2 O The 11th Circuit decision made reference to 2 O 
21 the fact that every employee could say this, but that 21 
22 employees must make the choice of ending harassment if 22 
2 3 they want to impose vicarious liability on the employer. 2 3 
2 4 Now, it may seem at odds to be talking about 2 4 
2 5 employee/employer relationships, but because this Court 2 5 
Page 9 
1 has followed the Ninth Circuit's directions in applying 1 
2 Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act, that there is a certain 2 
3 amount of employer/employee analogy that needs to take 3 
4 place in this educational setting for sexual harassment. 4 
5 And so let us not be confused by that particular 5 
6 language. 6 
7 The Court also read carefully the case of 7 
8 Barrett versus Applied Radiant Energy Corp. at 240 F.3rd 8 
9 262. That's a 2001 decision out of the Fourth Circuit, 9 
10 which has a similar holding to that in Baldwin. The 1 O 
11 facts that this Court is aware of and is in the record 11 
12 before the Court is that plaintiff has essentially 12 
13 admitted that her fear of retaliation from Mr. Friis was 13 
14 completely subjective. That he did not say he would 14 
15 retaliate against her. He did not threaten her in that 15 
16 way. He may have certainly engaged in sexually 1 6 
1 7 harassing behavior to her, but he articulated no threat 1 7 
18 to her should she choose to report it. She simply 18 
19 subjectively believed that there was a risk of 1 9 
2 O retaliation if she did report. 2 O 
21 The Court is aware that there are some excuses 21 
2 2 recognized by the federal decisions that were cited by 2 2 
2 3 the defense. Some excuses for the failure to promptly 2 3 
2 4 report, and those include the fact that a report has 2 4 
2 5 been previously made, but the employer does nothing to 2 5 
t~ CDA Reporting 
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follow up on the report leaving the employee with the 
belief that reporting is futile or a waste of time or 
they do so without the support of any procedures to 
support them in their reporting. 
Or another excuse for failure to promptly 
report is a credible fear of retaliation. But it Is 
identified in the federal case as cited by the defense 
that it must be more than a subjective belief that 
retaliation could exist, but a credible evidence-based 
fear of retaliation. 
Lastly -- or one of the other reasons that the 
defense has asked this Court to reconsider its previous 
decision is by the fact of the length of the delay in 
reporting that plaintiff waited on or the length of 
delay that existed. The facts in this case do establish 
that North Idaho College had a policy requiring students 
to report sexual harassment within 90 days. They had 
procedures then on how to follow up with that reporting. 
The defense position asserts that had she 
disclosed promptly, North Idaho College could have 
prevented further harassment. And they allege that in 
that when she did report, the Court has found that they 
did have policies and procedures in place and they did 
follow promptly and with certain exactitude those 
policies and procedures upon Ms. Johnson's reporting. 
Page 11 
The argument is had she reported earlier, they 
would have done the same thing and would have prevented 
further harassment that she may have experienced. It is 
instructive in the Baldwin case -- to go back to the 
Baldwin decision, the 11th Circuit in Baldwin found that 
a three-month and two-week delay was an unreasonable 
delay as a matter of law under the facts and 
circumstances of that case. 
Now, all cases are factually dominated. Every 
circumstance is different. But in that particular case, 
one in which the trial court did grant summary judgment 
for the defendant, there was the fact pattern of a 
November 2002 incident where an extremely vulgar and 
threatening language was used by a supervisor in this 
particular insurance company. A demand to the plaintiff 
in that circumstance in the context of that vulgarity 
and threatening demeanor of the question of "Are you on 
my team?" Or, in other words, are you an employee or a 
person that I supervise do you back me up, are you on my 
team, can I trust in your loyalty, was, I think, the 
paraphrasing of that particular situation. 
The employee, the district manager, was the 
one demanding in that vulgar and threatening way, 
demanding his supervisee to be on his team. She made no 
complaint about that. There were many -- several months 
Serving Idaho and Washington 
208.765.3666 (ID) 
509.703.6600 (WA) 
Fax.208.676.8903 - Free.888.894.2327 
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1 of no problems, but then in July 26th of 2001 this 1 
2 particular supervisor engaged in contact -- in conduct 2 
3 where he requested the supervisee or the plaintiff to 3 
4 spend the night with him. And on July the 31st he 4 
5 solicited that conduct from her again and subsequent 5 
6 suggestive behavior over the next few months that she 6 
7 was subjected to. 7 
8 She had career considerations that in her mind 8 
9 kept her from reporting this somewhat demanding and very 9 
1 O vulgar and very clear sexual harassment on the part of 1 O 
11 her supervisor. By September of 2001, there was a 11 
12 dispute about a bonus check that she believed -- the 12 
13 plaintiff believed was due. At any rate, she did not 13 
14 report until some three months and two weeks after the 14 
15 behavior that was exhibited to her and the 11th Circuit 15 
16 found that to be an unreasonable delay as a matter of 16 
1 7 law. 1 7 
18 The facts before this Court in North Idaho 18 
19 College's case and Ms. Johnson's case is much less 19 
2 O egregious behavior on the part of Mr. Friis. No direct 2 O 
21 threatening language or actions on the part of 2 1 
2 2 Mr. Friis. And, therefore, the defense urges this Court 2 2 
2 3 to find that the minimum five months delay by 2 3 
2 4 Ms. Johnson is unreasonable as a matter of law and 2 4 



























fact-finding determination as to whether that is 1 
reasonable or not. 2 
The defense also urged the Court to find that 3 
her mistake and belief that Mr. Friis had changed her 4 
grade from an I to an F was the reason for her 5 
reporting. And the court does find that to be 6 
factually -- certainly the inference to be drawn or the 7 
circumstances -- under those circumstances that she 8 
mistakenly believed that he had changed her grade. It 9 
was only then that she reported the harassment. And the 1 o 
evidence is that she wanted her grade changed back to an 11 
I for the purposes of keeping up her financial aid or 12 
keeping those concerns from losing her financial aid. 13 
Not necessarily for the purpose of stopping Mr. Friis's 14 
behavior. 15 
Plaintiffs opposition to the motion to 16 
reconsider has centered on just an assertion and rightly 1 7 
so because that's what the Court previously found in its 18 
order denying a summary judgment to the defense, they 19 
more or less continue to cite the assertion that there 2 O 
are genuine issues of material fact about whether she 2 1 
believed she needed to stay quiet and whether it was 2 2 
reasonable for her to delay in reporting in the manner 2 3 
that she did. 2 4 
This Court is granting defendant's motion for 2 5 
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reconsideration and in doing so will grant defendant's 
motion for summary judgment. This court relies on --
and other than its previous factual and conclusion of 
law assertions today, relies on the law in this area as 
articulated by many federal decisions that have been 
cited to the Court. That absent extreme circumstances 
creating a substantial and specific threat of 
retaliation, a generalized fear of retaliation for 
reporting sexual harassment does not constitute a valid 
basis for not reporting that sexual harassment. 
Those are the consistent pronouncements in the 
federal courts in interpreting Title 7 of the Civil 
Rights Act, which this court finds based on the 
direction of the Ninth Circuit does apply in this case 
and therefore those analysis apply as well. 
The court finds then as a matter of law 
plaintiff is foreclosed now under the Ellerth and 
Faragher affirmative defenses from pursuing this case. 
In other words, defendant has put into the 
record a factual basis supporting its affirmative 
defenses under Faragher and Ellerth. Plaintiff has 
failed to put into the record now admissible evidence or 
evidence by which a jury could reasonably find that she 
reasonably delayed in reporting or that her reason for 
not reporting was a reasonable one. The court exercises 
Page 15 
its gatekeeper function to the evidence that a jury is 
to decide to diminish the likelihood of a jury coming 
back with a verdict that really is contrary to 
pronouncements of law under the federal jurisdictions 
that have analyzed Title 7. 
And, therefore, finds that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact in this record whereby a 
jury could find that plaintiff has evidence in this 
record that would defeat the affirmative defenses put 
forth by the defense and the factual basis in the record 
for those defenses. 
Are there any questions from the plaintiff? 
MR. McMILLAN: No questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are there any questions from the 
defense? 
MR. CASTLETON: No, your Honor. I appreciate 
the Court's time and consideration. Thank you. 
THE COURT: You are welcome. And 
Mr. Castleton if you would please provide the court with 
an order granting your motion to reconsider and in that 
same order granting your motion for summary judgment 
rescinding the previous order denying the summary 
judgment and in this instance granting the summary 
judgment now for the reasons articulated in court today. 
MR. CASTLETON: I will do that. Thank you, 
January 11, 2011 
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1 your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Anything else from either party? 
3 MR. McMILLAN: Nothing further, your Honor. 
4 MR. CASTLETON: No. Thank you. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you. You are excused. 
6 MR. CASTLETON: Thanks, your Honor. 
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1 STATE OF IDAHO 
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I, Valerie Nunemacher, a notary public and 
duly certified court reporter in and for the St ate of 
Idaho, DO HEREBY CERTIFY: 
That the foregoing proceedings was taken on 
the date and at the time and place herein stated; 
That the foregoi ng is a true and correct 
transcription, to the best of my ability, of my 
shorthand notes taken dow n at said time and place in the 
above-entitled litigation; 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not related to any of 
the parties or attorneys t o this litigation and have no 
interest in the outcome of said litigation. 
hand this 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 
I, \-l~ ~ . I day of h:Tx1 I 2011. 
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